Conflicting Positions but Common Interests: An Analysis of the United States Antidumping Policy Toward China by Long, Qinglan
Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business
Volume 7 | Issue 2 Article 4
2008
Conflicting Positions but Common Interests: An
Analysis of the United States Antidumping Policy
Toward China
Qinglan Long
University of Hong Kong
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/global
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Qinglan Long, Conflicting Positions but Common Interests: An Analysis of the United States Antidumping Policy Toward China, 7 Rich. J.
Global L. & Bus. 133 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/global/vol7/iss2/4
CONFLICTING POSITIONS BUT COMMON
INTERESTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED
STATES ANTIDUMPING POLICY
TOWARD CHINA
Qinglan Long1
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Tariff Act of 1930, "dumping" is the sale of
goods imported from a foreign county at less than their "fair value" on
the domestic market.2 Thus, a good produced and sold in China for
twenty dollars, but sold in the United States for only fifteen dollars,
may be considered "dumped" on the U.S. market. The lower price may
be explained by the exporter's desire to gain market share or to mo-
nopolize the receiving market by selling its merchandise at a lower
price.3 After domestic manufacturers are driven out of the market, the
dumping manufacturer will recoup its initial losses by charging a
higher price. Dumping practices result in injured domestic industries.
To counteract its negative effects, countries have devised rules against
dumping.4 These rules, intended to nullify the impact of dumped mer-
chandise on the domestic market, vary depending on the country from
which the product originated and consider the various production fac-
tors and costs of the merchandise.5
II. U.S ANTIDUMPING DUTY LAW
The International Finance Daily reported that, in the past dec-
ade, World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries launched
246 antidumping investigations of China's exports, and that affirma-
tive results were found in approximately 60 percent of these investiga-
1 Research Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.; J.D.,
University of Kansas; L.L.M, L.L.B., Southwest University of Political Science and
Law, ChongQing, China.
2 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
3 Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Econo-
mies in Transition Under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 993, 997 (1995).
4 Terence P. Steward, U.S.-Japan Economic Disputes: The Role of Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Laws, 16 ARiz. J. INT'I & COMp. L. 689, 696 (1999).
5 Patricia H. Piskorski, A Dangerous Discretionary "Duty". U.S. Antidumping Pol-
icy toward China, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 603 (2005).
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tions.6 The United States claims that dumping by Chinese producers
results in a number of economically injurious effects on its market.
The most substantial effect produced by dumping is the harm inflicted
upon competing U.S. domestic producers. The United States asserts
that these producers will lose their respective market shares and will
be forced to close.'
In addition to monopolistic effects, dumping also distorts re-
source allocation.' The United States complains that Chinese dump-
ing injures the industries in its domestic market that use the dumped
products in the production process or as a component in the final prod-
ucts. For example, a car industry in the United States unaware of the
dumping of brakeage from China, may undertake expansion programs
in reliance on a continued supply of brakeage at the dumped price.
When the dumping is terminated, injury arises because the increased
inventory of other components would become idle, and the investment
in expansion becomes economically unsound. 9
United States antidumping duty law provides relief to Ameri-
can industries from dumping practices where: (1) the U.S. Department
of Commerce (DOC) determines that a class or kind of foreign mer-
chandise is being sold in the United States at less than its fair value,
and (2) the International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that an
industry in the United States is materially injured or threatened with
material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United
States is materially retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise
or by reasons of sales of the merchandise for the importation.'° If all
the elements are met, an antidumping duty would be imposed on the
imported goods." There are two ways antidumping cases are initi-
ated. The first occurs when the DOC determines that, on the basis of
available information, the elements of an antidumping duty exist.' 2
The other occurs when a domestic industry proposes that the United
States government initiate a dumping investigation against a foreign
firm whose low priced imports are injuring it. 3 The ITC investigation
6 See Dongshen Zang, Seeking Transparency in Antidumping Actions through Pro-
cedural Review: The GATTI WTO Jurisprudence and Its Implications for China,
PERSPECTIVEs, April 30, 2001, http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives/11_043001/
seeking-transparency inantidump.htm.
7 Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The Ascendancy
of Antidumping Measures, 18 Nw. J. INT' L L. & Bus. 49, 98 (1997).
8 Michael Kabik, The Dilemma of "Dumping" from Nonmarket Economy Country,
6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 339, 349 (1992).
9 Id., at 350.
10 19 U.S.C. § 1673b.
11 Id.
12 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(1).
13 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b).
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seeks to determine whether the dumping caused material injury to the
U.S. industry.14 If the product is sold below normal value and such
sales caused injury to a domestic industry, the DOC fixes an an-
tidumping duty on the imported product. 5 The DOC establishes the
duty based on the dumping margin by calculating the average amount
by which the fair market value of the product exceeds the price of the
product in the United States.'
6
When determining the dumping margin, the fair market value
of the product must first be calculated.' The calculation of the fair
market value of the product depends on the categorization of the coun-
try from which the product is exported.'" The exporting countries are
categorized as having either a market economy or a non-market econ-
omy (NME).' In cases involving the products originating from a mar-
ket economy, the DOC employs a standard method. The fair market
value is equal to the price at which the product is sold in the domestic
market.2 ° For an NME country, the process of calculating the fair
market value becomes much more complicated. NMEs impose unique
problems because, by definition, they do not allocate resources accord-
ing to market concepts of supply and demand. The price at which the
product sells is based on some other criteria set by the government.
The DOC assumes that government intervention may lead to whole-
sale subsidization in an NME. As a result, price of goods are subject to
discrepancies that distort their value.2 ' Therefore, the normal value is
not based on the home market prices but on the market values of a
surrogate country.
Briefly, the core criticism of antidumping law has focused on
computations to determine whether a country's products are being
dumped. According to one commentator, "dumping often occurs as a
result of American bureaucrats' manipulation of numbers, rather than
actual foreign business practices."2 2 The main issue is that the U.S.
administration sometimes finds that dumping has occurred when com-
paring dissimilar products. However, additional inherent inaccuracies
14 Id.
'5 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
16 Id.
17 See id.
18 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c).
19 Piskorski, supra note 5.
20 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A)-(B).
21 Piskorski, supra note 5, at 604.
22 See generally JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD: How CONGRESS PILLAGES
THE CONSUMER AND DECIMATES AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS (St. Martin's Press
1991).
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  135 2008
136 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 7:2
are present in determining "non-market economy products."23 These
additional factors arise from the method by which "fair value" is calcu-
lated when dealing with a product in a non-market economy. A fair
value determination with respect to the non-market economy coun-
tries is conducted by using the "factors of production" methodology as
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(b). The "factors of production" include
hours of labor, quantities of raw materials used, energy and other util-
ities consumed, and the capital costs.2 4 The DOC assesses a value of
the factors of production by using surrogate market countries as mod-
els. Under the "surrogate country" approach, a producer of compara-
ble goods in a market economy country of similar economic
development would have its actual price substituted in the determina-
tion of the foreign market value for the non-market economy
country.2 5
China has been protesting the use of the "surrogate country"
approach as an unfair and inaccurate practice. Developed countries
such as Norway, Austria and France have been chosen as surrogates,
resulting in great miscalculation.
III. CHINA'S COMPLAINT
Although the American anti-dumping methods used in relation
to China may represent an improvement over the historical trade ten-
sions on this issue, the use of market-based analysis denies Chinese
producers any comparative cost advantage which may otherwise exist.
The Chinese assert that the current antidumping law of the United
States does not provide a greater market orientation for China's eco-
nomic transition from a non-market economy into a market economy
country. 26 China's opposition to United States anti-dumping practices
was one of the last and most serious disagreements in the WTO acces-
sion negotiations.2 7 China claims that several problems are caused by
the anti-dumping duty laws.
23 A "non-market economy country", according to American perspective "is any
foreign country that the Department of Commerce determines it does not operate
on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in
such a country do not reflect the fair value of merchandise. See Lantz, supra note
3.
24 19 U.S.C. § 1677(b).
25 Sanhan Wang, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies Revised for
Fairness and Consistency, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 593, 616 (1996).
26 See Lei Yu, Rule of Law or Rule of Protectionism: Anti-Dumping Practices To-
ward China and the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 15 COLUM. J. AsiAN L. 293,
301 (2002).
27 Id.
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First, because each nation has a comparative advantage in
some factor of production, the "surrogate county" method fails to take
into consideration the possibility that the NME producer possesses
significant advantages in production that the surrogate producer does
not necessarily possess. 28 For example, the Chinese government as-
serts that the low prices of Chinese export commodities are the result
of relatively cheap labor and low production costs in China.2 9 India
and Pakistan, two countries often chosen as surrogates, have more ex-
pensive raw materials than China.30 As stated by Robert Lantz,
"[M]anufacturers tend to use more of the factors of production they
have in abundance, with a relatively lower cost, and less of the scarce
factors carrying relatively higher cost."3 ' Thus, the factors of produc-
tion used by a manufacturer from an NME country, combined with the
costs and factors of production in a surrogate market country with a
different cost structure, produce higher dumping margins than would
be assessed for a manufacturer from a market economy country.
32
Further disparity exists because NME exchange rates prevent the con-
version of prices to a meaningful dollar value.
3 3
Secondly, performance under various criteria might be mixed.
For example, products may be produced exclusively for consumption
under the Chinese state plan at set prices or they may be produced
partly for consumption under the Chinese state plan at set prices and
partly for consumption outside the state plan at state guided prices.
They may also be produced for consumption completely outside the
state plan and sold at a free market price. In the last few decades,
more products from China have been manufactured completely outside
the state plan and sold at free market prices. After the change in the
Chinese Constitution, private entities and enterprises obtained legiti-
mate status to compete in the market.3 4 While these factors account
for the substantial amount of Chinese exports, America's current "sur-
rogate country" anti-dumping policy fails to take these variables into
consideration.
28 Edwin A.Vermulst, The Anti-Dumping Systems of Australia, Canada, the EEC
and the United States of America: Have Anti-Dumping Laws Become a Problem in
International Trade?, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 765, 789 (1989).
29 See William P. Alford, When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Appli-
cation of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to
China and Other "Nonmarket Economy" Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 90 (1987).
30 Yu, supra note 26, at 328.
31 See Lantz, supra note 3, at 1007.
32 Id. at 1008.
33 Robert Franklin Hoyt, Implementation and Policy: Problems in the Application
of Countervailing Duty Laws to Nonmarket Economy Countries, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1647, 1658 (1988).
34 XIN FA art.11 (1996) (P.R.C).
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Finally, the outcome of United States antidumping investiga-
tions is unpredictable because China has no advance knowledge of
which surrogate will be used to determine its prices.3" The DOC de-
cides on a case-by-case basis which countries will be considered state-
controlled economies and which surrogate countries will be selected.3 6
Accordingly, a Chinese producer cannot know "before an export is
made whether the question of fair value will be determined on the ba-
sis of the Chinese home market price or data from an as yet unidenti-
fied surrogate."3 7 Thus, such producers are unable to plan ahead and
set their prices to comply with the United States anti-dumping laws.
IV. FOCUS ON INTEREST, NOT POSITIONS
In the well-renowned book, GETTING TO YES, Fisher and Ury
noted that because "parties problems often appear to be a conflict of
positions, and since their goal is to agree on a position, they naturally
tend to think and talk about positions and in the process often reach
an impasse."3 However, if the parties focus on interests instead of
positions, this would change. Interests motivate people and are the
silent movers behind positions.3 9 A position is a stance upon which a
party has decided, while an interest is the underlining reason that
causes a party to adopt such a decision." If two parties focus on their
opposite positions, they may be unable to identify compatible interests.
However, focusing on interests rather than positions enables the par-
ties to reconcile their differences and to begin developing solutions.
In the negotiation context, there are two principle negotiating
perspectives, namely adversarial (competitive or positional) and col-
laborative (problem solving)." Negotiation involves one-on-one direct
discussions between parties with a goal to narrowing any differences.
Successful negotiation leads to a common understanding or agreement
on previously uncommon positions.
In November 1999, American and Chinese negotiators con-
cluded a bilateral agreement concerning China's accession to the
WTO."2 The provisions of the agreement were included in the Final
35 See Alford, supra note 29, at 92.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES 40 (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin
Books 2d ed. 1991).
39 Id. at 41.
40 Id.
41 See generally id.
42 See SEAN LEONARD, THE DRAGON AWAKENS: CHINA'S LONG MARCH TO GENEVA
160-75 (London: Cameron 1999).
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  138 2008
2008] CONFLICTING POSITIONS BUT COMMON INTERESTS 139
Protocol.4 3 Section 15 of Part I deals with anti-dumping issues.4 4 This
agreement provides that, for purposes of applying anti-dumping duty
laws, the United States may treat China as an NME during the fifteen
years subsequent to China becoming a WTO member nation. How-
ever, since this agreement, the United States has launched numerous
anti-dumping claims against China with the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) and, accordingly, China ranks first in the world for the
number of anti-dumping suits lodged against it.
4 5
By the end of 2001, over 450 anti-dumping cases involving
more than $280 million USD were initiated regarding 4,000 categories
of Chinese products within the WTO system.46 Nearly half of these
anti-dumping suits were bought by the United States. 47 The rise in
antidumping cases has led to the criticism that the rule-based WTO
Dispute Settlement Body has increased the adversarial nature of the
proceedings. 4 1 "The result of the increase in litigation is that parties
become entrenched and polarized in their positions."4 9 Many coun-
tries argue that the negotiated settlement system would be strength-
ened, which shows good faith to resolve the dispute before resorting to
litigation.5 0 Statistics show that less than one-half of the antidumping
complaints actually go through the panel process, while the other one-
half are settled by negotiations.5 '
As discussed above, within five years of joining the WTO,
China ranked first as the nation with the highest number of anti-
dumping suits initiated against it, with the United States bringing
more cases than any other nation.5 2 It seems it is time for China and
the United States to reopen negotiations toward narrowing down dif-
ferences and reaching a common goal. In order to resolve their differ-
ences, the problem-solving approach would be the best choice because
it would avoid the emphasis on positional bargaining, while seeking to
meet the underlying needs of both parties. If the United States and
43 See id.
44 Sino-U.S. Accession Agreement, available at www.USA-China.org.
45 See Editorial, Anti-dumping Lawsuits Rankle, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 29,
2001, at Business Post 3 [hereinafter Anti-dumping Lawsuits Rankle].
46 Yu, supra note 26, at 299.
47 Id.
48 Alic Aranda, Sugar Wars; Dispute Settlement under NAFTA and WTO, 12 TEx.
HIsP. J. L. & POL'Y 121, 138 (2006).
49 Id.
50 See generally PETER SUTHERLAND ET. AL., CONSULTATIVE BOARD OF THE WTO,
THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: REPORT TO SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI, CH. VI: THE WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 49-60 (2005), available at http://www.wto.orglen-
glish/thewto e/l0anniv_e/future_wtoe.pdf.
51 Id. at 50.
52 See Anti-dumping Lawsuits Rankle, supra note 45.
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China applied the problem-solving approach to their anti-dumping ne-
gotiations, they could launch great dialogues concerning anti-dumping
issues and develop a method for dealing with their differences.
Because the problem-solving negotiation does not take place in
a vacuum, a variety of conditions must be met. The current relation-
ship between the United States and China is surrounded by factors
necessary to make anti-dumping negotiations successful.
(A) Interdependence
To ensure productive negotiation, the parties must be depen-
dent upon one another to satisfy their interests. 53 If one party can
have their needs met without the cooperation of the other, that party
will have little incentive to negotiate.5 4 Through its transition from a
centrally planned economy toward a market oriented economy, espe-
cially after its accession to the WTO, China's economic growth has in-
creased, contributing almost one-third of global GDP growth.5 5
Together, China and the United States accounted for nearly half of all
global growth in 2004.56 In light of China's achievements, United
States industries fear that China will "tilt global trade and technology
balances in its favor, ultimately becoming an economic, technological
and military threat to the United States. ,,5" Such industries have had
an increasing incentive to adopt protectionist policies towards Chinese
imports.
Despite differing positions regarding anti-dumping policy and
speculation about the threat that China poses to U.S. companies, the
United States wants China to undertake economic reform, comply
with its obligations as a WTO member, and participate in the global
economy. 58 The United States hopes that the WTO could play a role in
accelerating China's market reform, while providing an impetus to fur-
ther liberalize its trade activities.5 9
There are obvious reasons why China pushes for economic re-
form and access to WTO. "China benefits from the recognition and
53 Christopher W. Moore, Negotiation, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/
usace/negotiation.htm.
54 Id.
55 The Dragon and The Eagle: China's Economy is Larger Than It Looks, THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2004, at 3.
56 Id.
57 George J. Gilboy, The Myth Behind China's Miracle, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug.,
2004, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040701faessay83405/george-j-
gilboy/the-myth-behind-china-s-miracle.html.
58 See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphaz-
ard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1162, 1165 (1987).
'9 See Lawrence M. Reich, Foreign Policy or Foreign Commerce?: WTO Accessions
and the U.S. Separation of Powers, 86 GEO. L.J. 751, 758 (1998).
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prestige that WTO membership brings because WTO membership will
deepen China's integration into the world economy and signal its sta-
tus as a world economic power."6" In addition, WTO membership al-
lows China to create the legal framework necessary to support a
market economy.61
In an era of flourishing globalization, nations become more eco-
nomically interdependent. Both the United States and China can no
longer rely on policies that focus only on domestic production. Instead,
a new approach must be developed, acknowledging the importance of
global interactions and recognizing that growing economic interdepen-
dence mandates the cooperation of foreign and domestic industries.
The relationship between the United States and China is one of the
most important bilateral relationships for both nations today.6 2 The
protectionist measures of U.S anti-dumping rules would reverse recent
improvements in trade relations between the United States and
China. Not only are Chinese producers unsatisfied with the unfair an-
tidumping duties and given an incentive to avoid marketing goods in
the U.S, but U.S. consumers are affected by the unavailability of, or at
least price increases in, certain goods.6 3 These protectionist policies
could alienate the United States from its trade allies and diminish
U.S. influence in China. In addition to its adverse impact on relations
between the United States and China, other nations' markets may be
discouraged by decreased U.S. credibility and thus hesitate to com-
mence trade relations with the United States, impeding the goal of a
global economy.64
(B) Common interests
Negotiation parties must be able to agree upon some common
interests for a productive negotiation to occur.65 In any negotiation,
there are both opposed and compatible interests. "The number and
importance of the common issues and interests influence whether ne-
gotiations occur and whether they terminate in agreement. Parties
60 Karen Halverson, China's WTO Access: Economic, Legal and Political Implica-
tions, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 332 (2004).
61 See id. at 333.
62 Piskorski, supra note 5, at 628.
63 C.f Dorinda D. Bolander, Survey of the Court of International Trade: Anti-
Dumping Actions of 1992, 56 ALB. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1993) (discussing the legal
procedure for determining if a U.S. industry has been damaged by anti-dumping
laws).
64 See Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United
States with Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEo. WASH. J.
INT'L. L. & ECON. 539, 564 (1993).
65 Moore, supra note 53.
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must have enough issues and interests in common to commit them-
selves to joint decision-making process."66
1. The common interest in encouraging Chinese private entities.
In past decades, China's economic reforms have resulted in the
gravitation toward market orientation and, accordingly, China's econ-
omy should not be interpreted to mean that Chinese government is
involved in price setting. It is estimated that only twenty-five prod-
ucts in China are completely subject to state pricing, representing
about 18 percent of the total sales value of production.6 7 Prices for the
vast majority of products are now subject to market forces. 68 Eco-
nomic reforms have reduced the role of central government planning,
decentralized economic management, and allowed the expansion of
private and cooperative enterprises. Currently, the legitimate status
of private entities has been promulgated by the Chinese Constitu-
tion.6 9 A significant percentage of commodities exported from China
are manufactured by these newly established private enterprises and
joint ventures.7 °
Using the surrogate method, the DOC imposed excessively
high duties, placing the Chinese exporting company at a comparative
disadvantage in relation to U.S. companies. 7 1 Because unnaturally
high duties are imposed on goods from China, the ability of Chinese
private manufacturers to sell and export their products into the
United States will eventually be decreased. 72 Reducing access of pri-
vate manufacturers to the U.S. market will cause the Chinese private
sectors to lose profits, as well as U.S. market share. 73 As a result,
private Chinese firms will be unable to become significant global play-
66 Id.
67 Lei Wang, China and the WTO: A Negotiating History, 2 INT. TRADE L. & REG.
167, 169 (1996) (U.K.).
68 Id.
69 JIANFU CHEN, FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORISATION TO PRIVATE LAw: A COM-
PARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF THE DEVELOPING CIVIL LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 111 (1995) (discussing the 1988 amendment to China's constitution to
permit private economic growth).
70 Chinese's joint venture law has provided foreign investors with greater flexibil-
ity and favorable tax treatment in the establishment of enterprises within China.
See HONG KONG TRADE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, ANALYSIS OF THE DEMAND OF
MAINLAND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES FOR HONG KONG SERVICES, Dec. 10, 2003, availa-
ble at http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/tdc/tdc031205.htm.
71 Hongliu Gong, Legal Strategies for Challenging the Current EU Anti-Dumping
Campaign Against Imports from China: A Chinese Perspective, 27 BROOK J. INT'L
L. 575, 592 (2002).
72 Lantz, supra note 3, at 1008.
73 Id.
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  142 2008
2008] CONFLICTING POSITIONS BUT COMMON INTERESTS 143
ers, causing the Chinese government to continue to support the state-
owned sector and to disfavor the private sector.7 4 It is in the best in-
terest of the United States to encourage China to expand its private
sectors and open its markets to trade and investment. If the Chinese
private sector is substantially burdened by an unnecessary U.S. anti-
dumping duty, China will lose its moving force to transform into a
market economy. Then, U.S. foreign trade policy would lose credibility
as an important trade player in an era of flourishing transitions from
state controlled policies and economies to democratic governance.
2. The common interest in foreign direct investment.
Although China has maintained strong economic growth, U.S.
fears of China's possible threat are unwarranted because China's econ-
omy depends on direct foreign investment.7" "Foreign direct invest-
ment, exports and fixed-asset investment have been the important
pillars of China's economic growth during the past decade."7 6 Since
1978, China has taken in $500 billion in foreign direct investment and
the United States has directly invested more than $40 billion in
China. 77 A close look at China's exports reveals that most of China's
exporters are foreign-investment enterprises. Foreign-funded enter-
prises accounted for 55 percent of China's exports in 2003.78 In ad-
vanced industry exports, foreign investment enterprises increased
their total share of high-tech exports from 74 percent to 85 percent
between 1998 and 2002." 9 An example of such an industry is the com-
puter equipment industry, in which foreign investment enterprises
comprised 92 percent of all exports in 2003. so These data highlight
China's dependence on foreign investment, as well as the dominance of
foreign firms in China's exports. Even the domestic private sector can-
not compete with these dominant foreign firms when it comes to ex-
porting.8 ' With antidumping actions against China increasing and
profits decreasing, U.S. protectionist trade policies are hurting Ameri-
can investors and jeopardizing the type of economic relationship that
the United States has long sought to create. This is adverse to the
congressional intent of implanting NME antidumping duty law. The
U.S. Congress is willing to see if China is able to establish a free-mar-
74 Id.
75 See Gilboy, supra note 57.
76 Phelim Kyne, Foreign Investment in China Remains Strong, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 2004, at A15.
77 Gilboy, supra note 57.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
s See Gilboy, supra note 57 (indicating how the data demonstrates that China's
private firms are not yet significant global players).
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ket principle so that it could undergo substantial decentralization, al-
lowing the rapid growth of private enterprises and increasing China's
incentives to liberalize its trade practices. s2
3. The common interests in promoting Chinese transparency and
uniformity in administration.
By adopting the rules in China's protocol of accession, the
United States hopes that the WTO framework will act as political lev-
erage to bind China to make a broad market access commitment and
to push its economic reform to the next stage.8 3 In addition to trade
liberalization, the United States expects that China's access to the
WTO would afford China full participation as a WTO member and ful-
fill its international obligations by promoting its transparency and
predictability and by executing uniform administration.8 4 On the con-
trary, the United States antidumping duty laws toward China create
"inaccurate margins, unpredictability and decreased cooperation in in-
ternational norms." 5 U.S. antidumping calculations toward China
have also been criticized as being "a result of American bureaucrats'
manipulation of numbers, rather than actual foreign business prac-
tices." 6 "The low threshold requirement increases [the] chance of U.S.
private petitioners to harass Chinese exporters by allowing them too
easily instigate antidumping investigations.""7 Such policies can
hardly promote transparency and uniformity in the Chinese adminis-
tration. Moreover, China has started its own antidumping investiga-
tion and legislation in recent years. The Chinese Antidumping
Regulations were enacted in 1997.88 The Chinese government has car-
ried out nineteen antidumping investigations through May, 2002.9
The United States expects that China's antidumping regulation will
serve as an external force to develop a positive model for independent
82 See Brad L. Bacon, The People's Republic of China and the World Trade Organi-
zation: Anticipating a United States Congressional Dilemma, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 369, 388-89 (2000). The United States Congress encouraged China's acces-
sion to WTO to open an enormous market to U.S. exporters, promote faster growth
in the productivity of China's private entities, and provide the broad economic and
institutional changes in China necessary for becoming an open, stable and, pros-
perous observer of global norms.
83 Halverson, supra note 60, at 334.
84 Id. at 335-336.
85 Piskorski, supra note 5, at 621.
86 Yu, supra note 26, at 327-328.
87 Piskorski, supra note 5, at 621.
88 See generally Shen Jianming, A Critical Analysis of China's First Regulation on
Foreign Dumping and Subsidies and Its Consistency with WTO Agreements, 15
BERK. J. INT'L L. 295 (1997).
89 Id.
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and transparent judicial and administrative enforcement. 9 0 However,
if the Chinese government conducts antidumping investigations
against U.S. exporters as retaliation against United States antidump-
ing policy, U.S. exporters would suffer unnecessary injury as the result
of U.S protectionist antidumping policy.
4. The common interests in changing Chinese human right policies.
U.S. policies that treat China as an NME country in anti-
dumping issues may also be instituted as an attempt by the United
States to correct Chinese human rights policies that it views as inade-
quate. The U.S.-China WTO agreement was expected to strengthen
the rule of law in China by promoting the basic rules of fairness, equal-
ity and justice, and legal and administrative independence, all of
which are considered critical to fostering basic human rights. 9 1 For-
mer U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefky declared that
China "will join the community governed by the rule of [1]aw" after
entering into the WTO.92 However, the actual effect of protectionist
anti-dumping rules is to reduce the number of available jobs of China,
weaken newly-developed private sectors, slow economic growth, and
lower the Chinese standard of living.93 The overall effect of these anti-
dumping measures is to eliminate economic individual rights in
China.9 4 By the same token, the protectionism of antidumping rules
provides no impetus for the Chinese government to either improve its
political human rights or to accelerate its process of legal reform.
(C) Broadening the options
People involved in negotiation rarely sense the value of having
multiple options. Each side sees the situation as essentially black or
white.9 5 For negotiation parties to reach an agreement over issues
about which they disagree, they must create a large number of options
from which both parties can jointly choose. Inventing options involves
creative thinking. Each party should abstain from looking for one
"best" answer by threatening or inflicting pain upon the other side. To
the contrary, both sides need to invent a substantial number of differ-
ent ideas such as providing new policies, seeking the advice of differ-
ent experts, asking thought-provoking questions, exercising legitimate
90 M. Ulric Killion, Quest for Legal Safeguard for Foreign Exporter Under China's
Anti-Dumping Regime, 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 417, 417 (2004).
91 Bill Nichols & James Cox, Backers Hope China Pact Will Promote Reform, USA
TODAY, Sept. 20, 2000, at A10.
92 Id.
93 McGee, supra note 64, at 553.
94 Id.
95 FISHER & URY, supra note 38, at 59.
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authority, and providing rewards. This could broaden the options for
both parties and create a mutually advantageous relationship.9 6
China has long argued that is should not be treated as an NME
in light of recent reforms in the market orientation of its economy.9 7
Notwithstanding its position, the United States and other WTO mem-
bers still treat China as a non-market economy for purposes of con-
ducting antidumping investigations against Chinese companies in its
protocol of accession to the WTO.9 s As discussed above, this anti-
dumping duty is inherently restrictive since it only recognizes two spe-
cific types of economies, "market" and "non-market."99 There is no
"gray area" for transitioning economies, such as China's, that under-
take tremendous economic reforms toward a more market-oriented
economy. 1° ° Therefore, when investigating a specific case, the DOC is
forced to categorize the country's economy as either a market or a non-
market economy despite the fact that, in reality, countries exist which
may be neither. 10
Given the shared interests of China and the United States to
promote China's economic reform, combined with problems related to
current antidumping duties, a favorable alternative to the "all or noth-
ing" approach of determining a country's market orientation in the an-
tidumping duty law would be a sector-to-sector analysis of the non-
market economy country where it exhibits "bubbles of capitalism." 0 2
Under the promise of a sector-by-sector transition, a non-market econ-
omy country in transition could have some sectors operating under the
market principle. In calculating the fair market value, the DOC
should include the cost of production factors in these sectors as pur-
chased under market conditions, while obtaining the cost of remaining
sectors from the surrogate country.' 0 3 This sector-by-sector analysis is
a very case-specific approach that focuses on individual manufacturers
rather than the entire industry.'14 Using market-driven costs will mo-
tivate these individual manufacturers to continue to operate under
market principles. Moreover, by using this methodology, the market
value of Chinese products would be more indicative of true costs with-
out being overly influenced by particular aspects of any third-country
economy.
96 Id. at 57-70.
97 See Alford, supra note 29, at 97-98.
98 Piskorski, supra note 5.
99 Id.
100 Michael Kabik, The Dilemma of Dumping from Non-Market Economy Country,
6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 339, 379-380 (1992).
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Lantz, supra note 3, at 1039.
104 Alford, supra note 29, at 92.
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Another method to adjust the threshold requirements of cur-
rent antidumping duty laws is to modify the injury test. The current
threshold is too low; where a sale is at less than foreign market value,
there is an injury. 10 5 Private petitioners can easily manipulate the
test by instigating antidumping investigations without adequate proof.
The injury test should be modified so that a greater level of injury
would be required or that actual, rather than potential, injury would
be required.
Since the DOC has been given the wide range of discretion in
the investigation and determination of dumping activities, another so-
lution would be to give the Court of International Trade (CIT) a
heightened standard of review. Currently, the CIT use the reasonable-
ness standard to review DOC decisions.106 The CIT must sustain each
DOC determination, unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence
on the record or is not in accordance with the law.'o 7 The reasonable-
ness standard is highly deferential, entrusting the DOC with too much
discretion in determining antidumping duties. In other words, each
DOC decision is upheld provided its interpretation is reasonable, even
if the CIT held a differing opinion.' Should the CIT review standard
be stricter, the DOC would be forced to investigate antidumping cases
more thoroughly so as to convince the CIT while "using a surrogate
country to determine home market data for non-market economies." 10 9
Such a heightened standard would ensure procedure adherence with
U.S. antidumping law and help the United States maintain credibility
with foreign countries.
Although these methods make it more difficult to reach an af-
firmative dumping determination, they may create greater incentives
for China to negotiate with the United States. For example, under the
sector-by-sector method, a Chinese manufacturer will know that the
actual cost will be used to determine the market value of exports and
will, therefore, be more willing to share information and participate in
negotiations. Moreover, since China's economy is not static, the
United States must accept that China is a work-in-progress and can-
not yet meet all the standards of a full-fledged market economy. The
more constructive treatments under antidumping duty law may moti-
vate China's non-market economy sectors to make pricing and produc-
tion decisions on a market basis. Over the past fifty years, the United
States has long sought to see China establish a rules-based economy
and integrate into global economic networks that would compel China
105 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1998).
106 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(1)(C).
107 Id.
108 Piskorski, supra note 5, at 630-631.
109 Bolander, supra note 63, at 1047.
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to commence political reforms.1 1 ° Thus, alternative methods of anti-
dumping law would reinforce already existing U.S. strategic engage-
ment with China and encourage greater ones.
V. CONCLUSION
As the United States and China have become more intertwined
with each other economically, their trade exchanges have expanded
dramatically. Simultaneously, there is increasing tension between the
two nations regarding the current U.S. anti-dumping policy. Conflicts
between the two counties regarding antidumping policy call for more
negotiations so that the problem can be resolved without reaching a
point of crisis. Through problem solving negotiations, the United
States and China could find common interests and merge their differ-
ences. Moreover, the problem-solving approach would lead the two na-
tions to enter into agreements on the antidumping issue and further
liberalize their trade activities.
110 See generally Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Re-
lating to International Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 374 (2000).
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